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South African (SA) law currently forbids those seeking 
to arrange a surrogate motherhood agreement from 
creating a child that will not be genetically related to 
at least one of them. For a surrogacy contract to be 
legally valid, there must be a ‘genetic link’ between the 
child created through a surrogate and the parents who will raise it. 
Specifically, the law says:
‘No surrogate motherhood agreement is valid unless the 
conception of the child contemplated in the agreement is to be 
effected by the use of the gametes of both commissioning parents 
or, if that is not possible due to biological, medical or other valid 
reasons, the gamete of at least one of the commissioning parents 
or, where the commissioning parent is a single person, the gamete 
of that person.’[1]
This law implies that at least one of the commissioning parents must 
provide a gamete, i.e., either sperm or eggs, which will be used to 
form the embryo of the child that she or they intend to rear.
Interest in this topic is heating up in SA, with a recent (brief ) ethical 
overview of the matter having been published[2] and a legal challenge 
currently being made against SA’s Minister of Social Development, 
who supports the current law.[3] To begin to appreciate some of the 
rationale for doubting the justice of the law, consider the following 
scenario.
Imagine a couple that has tried for over a decade to get pregnant, 
but has been unable to do so. Suppose that he is sterile and she is now 
in her late 40s, without viable eggs and unable to gestate a fetus. And 
yet both still long to be involved with a child from the start, perhaps 
one that is likely to have features similar to theirs. The law, as it stands 
in SA, forbids them from using a surrogate mother who would carry 
an embryo fertilised by donor gametes that the couple has selected.
In this article I appeal to moral-philosophical reasons to conclude 
that SA’s surrogacy law is unjust in respect of the above scenario 
and those similar to it. I rebut rationales, usefully divided into 
consequentialist and non-consequentialist moral arguments, for 
thinking that the law is justified. The consequentialist arguments 
maintain that the results of changing the law to permit surrogacy 
without a genetic link would be undesirable in some way, 
perhaps for causing harm to the child or starting a ‘slippery slope’ 
towards a society that systematically employs eugenics. The non-
consequentialist arguments contend that there is something 
immoral in itself, apart from the long-term consequences, about 
creating a child that will not be genetically related to the parents 
who care for it. After arguing against both attempts to ethically 
justify the status quo, I provide some positive reasons for thinking 
that the law is unjust.
Note that in this article I do not address broader issues relating to 
the ethics of in vitro fertilisation (IVF), the destruction of embryos, 
embryo transfer and gestational surrogacy. I focus strictly on whether 
surrogacy is morally impermissible and should be legally forbidden 
for the specific reason that a genetic link would be missing between 
those commissioning the pregnancy and the created child. In 
addition, I do not wade into the thicket of ethical debates about 
related issues such as cloning and genetic enhancement, and where 
they are mentioned, it is only to put the present issue in context.
Most of those who have written on surrogacy in the absence 
of a genetic link have been either religious conservatives, on the 
one hand, or radical transhumanists, on the other. They have either 
sought to preserve traditional mores or to completely upend 
them in favour of overhauling human nature towards something 
allegedly much better. Part of my aim in this article is to articulate 
a moderate position, in between these extremes and grounded on 
values consonant with SA’s Constitution, including contemporary 
understandings of the African ethic of ubuntu.
Consequentialist arguments 
for a genetic link
A consequentialist argument for a certain law is a moral rationale 
according to which the long-term outcomes for society with the 
law would be better than without it. Frequently called ‘cost-benefit 
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analysis’ in the realm of public policy, the idea is that a norm is justified 
insofar as it is expected to produce more good and to reduce more 
bad than the feasible alternatives to it.
Applied to the law requiring a genetic link between those who 
create a child and those who intend to rear it, the claim would be 
that more desirable net benefits are expected from the law than from 
some other law that could realistically be adopted. In the present 
context, two types of harm are most commonly discussed, namely 
psychological damage to the child who has been created, and the 
much more far-reaching prospects of opening the floodgates to a 
society that uses eugenics to enhance embryos.
Would the created child be harmed?
One natural question to ask about a child who would be reared with 
parents genetically unrelated to him is whether he would badly off as 
a result. In particular, perhaps such a child would be confused about 
his identity or, as the moral philosopher J David Velleman has put it, 
suffer from a kind of blindness about who he is:
‘In coming to know and define themselves, most people rely on 
their acquaintance with people who are like them by virtue of 
being their biological relatives ... Knowing what I am like would 
be that much harder if I didn’t know other people like me. And if 
people bear me a literal family resemblance, then the respects in 
which they are like me will be especially relevant to my knowledge 
of what I am like ... Not knowing any biological relatives must be 
like wandering in a world without reflective surfaces, permanently 
self-blind.’[4]
Based on one oft-cited study,[5] some psychologists have also 
indicated concern about those reared in families with whom they lack 
a genetic link in terms of feeling different and consequently lacking 
some self-esteem.
Now, children who are adopted lack a genetic link with the parents 
looking after them, and virtually no one believes that adopting 
such a child is immoral and that staying in an orphanage would be 
preferable. So, one might wonder whether there is a genuine prima 
facie concern on this score.
However, there is plausibly some morally relevant difference 
between adopting a child who already exists and who will lack a 
genetic link with its parents, on the one hand, and creating a child 
who does not yet exist and who will lack a genetic link with its parents, 
on the other. Perhaps it is impermissible to create a person whom one 
can foresee is likely to undergo some kind of psychological harm, but 
permissible to adopt an extant person who might suffer the same 
harm, when doing so would minimise the harm he would face overall, 
viz. if left in an orphanage. Velleman also makes this point eloquently:
‘Much as we love disadvantaged children, we rightly believe that 
people should not deliberately create children who they already 
know will be disadvantaged. In my view, people who create children 
by donor conception already know – or already should know – that 
their children will be disadvantaged by the lack of a basic good 
on which most people rely in their pursuit of self-knowledge and 
identity formation.’[4]
And since the law in relation to children ought to serve their interests, 
it should forbid creating children who will foreseeably lack a genetic 
link to those who rear them, or so the argument goes.
I have two objections to make to this argument. First, I point to very 
recent and substantial counter-evidence, viz. based on large samples 
and longitudinal studies, indicating that psychological harm has not 
been suffered by the offspring of donated gametes in respect of a lack 
of a genetic link with their parents.[6-9] One of these concludes: ‘The 
findings of this study add to the growing body of research suggesting 
that biological relatedness between parents and children is not 
essential for positive child adjustment.’[6]
My second point is that even if, for the sake of argument, there were 
some foreseeable harms to an adolescent or adult who lacks a genetic 
link to his parents, it would not necessarily be immoral to create him, 
since the alternative would be his non-existence, which is far from 
obviously preferable (for a different but related answer to this question, 
which emphasises the fact that the law seeks to remove children from 
parents only in the most extreme cases, see Meyerson[10]).
Returning to a comparison between adopting a genetically 
unrelated child and creating one, the alternative to adoption is that 
a child remains alive in the care of a state orphanage or the like. The 
alternative to creating a child with donated gametes and a surrogate 
birth-mother is the non-existence of that child. Hence, for the present 
consideration of harm to the child to hold weight, it must be that 
never existing at all would be better for a child than being created 
and then living in a loving, supportive home with parents who are not 
genetically related to him.
That claim is, if not absurd, then extraordinarily dubious and, still 
more, morally improper as a ground of law. Surely, the relevant test 
is whether the life of the created child would be worth living. And I 
submit that the overwhelming majority of those working in ethics 
would contend that your life could indeed be worth living even if 
you were not genetically related to parents who loved you and did 
all they could to help you flourish in the world. After all, virtually 
no one believes that it would be better for, say, an adopted child 
in an intimate, supportive household to die than to carry on living. 
However, the logic of the present argument entails that it would be, 
by virtue of the alleged harm occasioned by being reared by those 
not genetically related to him.
Would a eugenic rat-race ensue?
Here is another version of a consequentialist argument for SA’s law 
requiring a genetic link between those who create a child and those 
who intend to rear it. It appeals not to the short- to medium-term 
harm to the child, but rather to long-term results for the broader 
society. Even if the specific offspring of donated gametes would 
not suffer in terms of their identities or otherwise, it could be that 
changing the law to allow people to create such children would have 
disastrous consequences down the road for others.
In particular, it is natural to be concerned about opening the 
floodgates to a eugenic society in which embryos are routinely 
screened and engineered with regard to traits such as sex, height, 
intelligence, memory, patience, beauty and related traits that tend 
to confer competitive advantage. Perhaps in such a society children 
would be ‘reduced to’ their genetic potential and not given the 
freedom to act in accordance with their own desires. Maybe there 
would be even more systematic kinds of inequality, biologically 
engendered through genetic manipulation, beyond the social ones 
of race and class that are already so salient in SA society. It could 
even be the case that opening the door to severing any genetic 
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link between children and parents could encourage society to allow 
the converse of an identical genetic link in the form of reproductive 
cloning (famously argued by Leon Kass[11]).
There might of course be some thinkers who maintain that these risks 
would be worth the benefits of much-improved health to the human 
race. However, I set that sort of transhumanist and fairly radical 
objection aside. Instead of welcoming the slippery slope, I provide 
reason to doubt that it would be likely to occur.
Slippery slopes are often readily forestalled by putting laws 
and other rules in place. A few such laws already exist in SA. 
SA could continue its policy of forbidding commercial gamete 
distribution[12] and commercial surrogacy,[13] permitting these 
practices only for altruistic reasons, with compensation for time and 
other inconvenience being the only financial element involved. It 
could retain the requirement that only people who cannot give birth 
themselves may make use of surrogacy.[14] And it could of course 
continue to maintain a ban on human cloning.[15]
I do not express any view in this article as to which of these kinds 
of ‘brakes’, if any, would be appropriate. My point is merely that 
something of the sort appears to be on hand, if one were keen to 
stop the slide towards a society in which, say, the rich seek out the 
choicest donated eggs and sperm, or the genetic engineering of their 
own, with the aim of creating what in the popular press are often 
called ‘designer babies’[16,17] who would eventually dominate the rest 
of society.
Non-consequentialist arguments 
for a genetic link
Non-consequentialist arguments in favour of forbidding people 
from creating children they know will not be genetically related to 
themselves imply that there is something wrong with doing so ‘in 
itself’, setting aside consideration of the results of doing so. Too often 
such arguments either appeal to religious tracts about God’s will, 
which hardly command acceptance from a broad array of rational 
enquirers, on the one hand, or to vague and easily questioned 
rationales about such a practice being ‘unnatural’ (so is getting a 
tattoo) or a matter of ‘playing God’ (so is killing in self-defence), on 
the other.
In this section, I instead focus on arguments that are prima 
facie stronger, some of which have been advanced by Kass, who 
acknowledges the weaknesses of the usual rationales. Kass, in my 
opinion, has two distinct arguments for a genetic link: according to 
one, lineage is good for its own sake, and according to another, sexual 
procreation, which implies a genetic link, is good for its own sake. As 
I will demonstrate, both arguments rest on the basic principle that 
human nature has a dignity that is not to be degraded, and I will bring 
out respects in which this principle is deeply flawed as a reason for 
concluding that a genetic link is morally required. I will also address 
an ubuntu-based argument for a genetic link that appeals to the 
moral value of kinship.
A requirement to respect the dignity 
of ‘human nature’
About the first uses of IVF, Kass, at least as of 2002,[18] says that he 
has no complaint, since they involved taking the sperm and eggs 
of a married couple to create an embryo that they would then rear. 
Speaking of this intramarital use of IVF, Kass remarks that ‘there could 
be no objection. Here indeed is the natural and proper home for the 
human embryo. Here indeed is the affirmation of transmission and 
the importance of lineage and connectedness.’[18]
However, criticising the use of IVF and embryo transfer for the 
purposes of creating a child that will not have a genetic link to those 
who rear it, Kass says that such new techniques will serve:
‘... not to ensure and preserve lineage, but rather to confound and 
complicate it ... Properly understood, the largely universal taboo 
against incest, and also the prohibitions against adultery, defend 
the integrity of marriage, kinship, and especially the lines of origin 
and descent. These time-honored restraints implicitly teach ... clarity 
about who your parents are, clarity in the lines of generation, clarity 
about who is whose ... This means, concretely, no encouragement 
of embryo adoption or especially of surrogate pregnancy.’[18]
Some of Kass’s rationale is consequentialist, to the effect that when 
origins and parentage become opaque, the prospects of what he calls 
‘civilized community’ decline. However, another part of it, on which I 
focus here, is non-consequentialist and, specifically, a matter of respect 
for human dignity. Elsewhere Kass remarks, ‘Man is partly defined by 
his origins; to be bound up with parents, siblings, ancestors, is part of 
what we mean by “human”,’[19] so that when people are foreseeably 
created without a genetic link to those who will take care of them, then 
they are objectionably treated as inhuman.
Not only are the embryo, fetus and child treated inhumanly or 
degraded by virtue of knowingly being created in ways that sever 
the genetic relationship between them and their caregivers, but the 
parents themselves, and perhaps the traditional family more generally, 
are treated disrespectfully. On this, Kass remarks in an early article:
‘There are more and less human ways of bringing a child into the 
world. I am arguing that the laboratory production of human beings 
is no longer human procreation, that making babies in laboratories 
– even ‘perfect’ babies – means a degradation of parenthood ... If the 
depersonalization of the process of reproduction and its separation 
from human sexuality dehumanize the activity which brings new 
life, and if the manufacture of human life threatens its humanness, 
both together add up to yet another assault on the existence of 
marriage and the human family.’[19]
Kass also has this to say:
‘When it comes to human biotechnical engineering, only if there 
is something inherently good or dignified about, say, natural pro-
creation, human finitude, the human life cycle (with its rhythm of 
rise and fall), and human erotic longing ... only then can we begin 
to see why those aspects of our nature need to be defended. (It is 
for this reason why a richer bioethics will always begin by trying to 
clarify the human good and aspects of our given humanity that are 
rightly dear to us, and that biotechnology may serve or threaten.) 
We must move from the hubristic attitude of the powerful designer 
to consider how the proposed improvements might impinge upon 
the nature of the one being improved.’[20]
Notice the difference in argument here from the previous one. The 
logic of the present argument entails a much broader conclusion, 
to the effect that even using IVF in ways that preserve a genetic link 
is immoral for not being part of the characteristic process by which 
human beings procreate, viz. by sexual intercourse.
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As Kass himself seems to have changed his mind about that, as per 
the discussion above regarding intramarital use of IVF, one might be 
tempted to set the present rationale aside. However, both arguments 
are a straightforward product of a common moral foundation, and so 
I will continue to address them both. I suspect that they stand or fall 
together.
Both of the previous arguments, when understood in non-
consequentialist terms, maintain that human nature has a dignity 
that it is wrong to degrade, that the use of reproductive technologies 
and surrogacy to create a child that will not be genetically related to 
its caregivers degrades human nature, and hence that they are wrong 
to use. Here, I argue that the claim that human nature has a dignity 
can be understood in one of two major ways, of which one begs the 
question and the other has extremely counterintuitive implications.
To say that ‘human nature’ has a dignity is ambiguous, for it is not 
clear whether that phrase is associated with a ‘moralised’ concept 
or not. A moralised concept is one that is inherently evaluative or 
normative, and is the sort of notion that ethicists invoke for a living, 
with good examples being justice, virtue, well-being, meaningfulness 
and human excellence. Given the ways in which these concepts are 
normally invoked, one would be contradicting oneself to say that 
there is nothing desirable about virtue and that one has no reason to 
seek it out. In contrast, a non-moralised concept does not essentially 
include some kind of appraisal, and is instead the sort of notion that 
a scientist would employ to describe some facet of the world. Here, a 
very good example is the anthropological concept of Homo sapiens.
My contention is that speaking of ‘human nature’ could mean either 
human excellence or Homo sapiens, and that Kass’s arguments fail to 
convince, regardless of which is meant. First, consider the differences 
in what the phrase ‘human nature’ might mean, depending on 
whether a moralised concept is intended or not.
Sometimes when we speak of ‘human nature’, we have moralised 
ideals in mind, e.g. when we praise someone in Yiddish for being a 
mentsh, or in German for displaying Menschlichkeit, or in the Nguni 
languages for exhibiting ubuntu (literally, humanness for Zulu, Xhosa 
and Ndebele people). When we speak of ‘humanity’ in these contexts, 
we are referring to particular aspects of human nature that we find to 
be intrinsically valuable or good for their own sake.
Other times when we speak of ‘human nature’ we have a much 
more neutral concept in mind. Here, we would be speaking of 
humanity as a species, comparable in connotation to the categories 
of Canis lupis familiaris (domestic dogs) or Felis catus (domestic cats). 
A scientific use of the term refers to a being with a particular sort of 
DNA, a natural kind distinct from others on earth.
Here, now, is the rub. Kass must have one or the other sense of 
‘human nature’ in mind, and it turns out that neither will do any 
justificatory work for him.
Suppose, first, that Kass is using a moralised concept. In that case, it 
is quite plausible to assert that so-called ‘human nature’ has a dignity 
or otherwise deserves respect; for it is a priori designated as picking 
out features of us that are good for their own sake. However, if Kass 
now claims that conditions such as maintaining a genetic link and 
reproducing sexually are parts of ‘human nature’ that deserve respect, 
then he is begging the question against those who are inclined to 
deny these claims. If these conditions are facets of human nature in 
a moralised sense, then Kass is merely asserting that they are good 
for their own sake in calling them aspects of ‘human nature’. But he is 
supposed to be contributing to a debate about whether they indeed 
deserve respect, and merely calling them ‘human nature’, and hence 
implicitly good for their own sake thereby, does not provide a reason 
to believe that they are.
Suppose Kass is instead using a non-moralised concept of human 
nature. To say that maintaining a genetic link and reproducing 
sexually are parts of human nature in this sense does not beg the 
question and indeed is clearly true. Characteristically, human beings 
as a species do reproduce sexually and thereby maintain a genetic 
link with the children for whom they care. Of course, not all human 
beings do that. However, even though not all domestic cats meow 
and have four legs, it is true that the species Felis catus does.
Now, making the descriptive point that members of Homo sapiens 
characteristically reproduce sexually and are genetically related to 
the offspring they look after carries with it no evaluation. And so it is 
quite open for one to question whether it is good for its own sake or 
otherwise deserves respect. After all, there are other facets of ‘human 
nature’ in the descriptive sense that are clearly bad and should 
instead be shunned, as well as some that are neither good nor bad.
For instance, it is plausible to think that members of Homo sapiens 
have a disposition to see others who they perceive as different from 
themselves as pollution and to want to cleanse themselves of such 
others upon feeling threatened.[21] It is such an orientation that 
I believe best accounts for atrocities such as the Nazi Holocaust, 
the Rwandan genocide and many other large-scale crimes against 
humanity. Supposing for the sake of argument that this disposition 
were indeed part of our inherent biological make-up, it would 
nonetheless not deserve respect. Kass cannot plausibly claim that 
‘human nature’ in the descriptive sense is completely valuable and 
worthy of protection.
For an additional example, being born with four toes on each 
foot instead of five would be a deviation from ‘human nature’ in 
the descriptive sense, but would not carry with it anything of moral 
salience. Similar remarks, for all that has been said so far, might well 
go for conditions such as ensuring a genetic link between children 
and parents.
In sum, when Kass says things such as ‘Man is partly defined by his 
origins’, he means either (i) that human beings are good for their own 
sake insofar as they have come from a certain source, which begs the 
question against people like me who doubt that; or (ii) that human 
beings characteristically come from a certain source, which is true but 
carries with it no normative appraisal and is therefore up for grabs in 
terms of whether it deserves respect or not.
Parts of human nature are surely valuable and deserve respect, 
but not all of them, and Kass does not provide substantive reason 
to think that a genetic link is one of them. Indeed, he is well known 
for eschewing the idea that we can reason much about ethical 
matters, instead finding wisdom in people’s emotional reactions of 
repulsion, widely known among bioethicists as the ‘yuck factor’. Few 
contemporary professional ethicists and moral philosophers, however, 
think that people’s common disgust of, say, inter-racial romance in the 
20th century was revealing of anything morally significant.
A requirement to exhibit human excellence
As I have indicated above, ‘ubuntu’ means humanness or human 
excellence, in other words attitudes and behaviour that are morally 
upright and to be pursued in life. In an SA context, it is natural to want 
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to know what an ubuntu-based ethic would entail for the present 
moral dilemma.
In addition, one might have the strong suspicion that an indigenous 
African ethic would require there to be a genetic link between parents 
commissioning a surrogate and the resultant child, given how often 
kinship relationships are prized in sub-Saharan Africa. As Anthony 
Appiah remarks of a typically African approach to ethics:
‘This form of moral thought permits someone, the agent, to treat 
someone else, the patient, in a certain manner because the two are 
related, not because the patient has particular qualities or needs, 
for example, I might give shelter to someone “because she is my 
kinswoman”.’[22]
The recurrent focus on kinship, which connotes blood ties and common 
descent, among traditional African peoples might lead one to think 
that it should be of utmost importance when creating children, i.e. that 
one would fail to exhibit ubuntu, and would rather be acting in a more 
animalistic manner, in knowingly creating a child that would not be 
related to one. Perhaps those who question SA’s law, such as myself, 
are simply Western liberals who prize autonomy above all.
I cannot comment on what a given indigenous people in sub-
Saharan Africa would say about the ethics of using IVF, embryo 
transfer and gestational surrogacy to create a child that would lack 
a genetic link to the commissioning parents. What I can speak to, 
however, are the values typically prized by post-war moral theorists 
who claim inspiration by mores associated with ubuntu.
Conceptions of how to relate morally to others in recent southern 
(and more generally sub-Saharan) African analyses of ubuntu do 
not tend to include the idea of anything biological. What is instead 
recurrent in the literature about the proper relationships to have with 
others in order to exhibit human excellence are these social elements: 
sharing a way of life with others and caring for others’ quality of life. 
That is, it is characteristic of adherents to ubuntu to maintain that one 
displays virtue to the extent that one enjoys a sense of togetherness 
with others, participates with them on a co-operative basis, and helps 
them out of sympathy or otherwise for their sake.[23] Communal or 
harmonious relationships are what matter, not genetic ones.
In support of my interpretation, consider the following repre-
sentative remarks of SA thinkers on the nature of ubuntu. First, 
note that former SA Constitutional Court Justice Yvonne Mokgoro 
remarks of an ubuntu ethic, ‘Harmony is achieved through close and 
sympathetic social relations within the group.’[24]
Prof. Muxe Nkondo, who has had positions of leadership on SA’s 
National Heritage Council, says: ‘If you asked ubuntu advocates and 
philosophers: What principles inform and organise your life? What do 
you live for? ... the answers would express commitment to the good 
of the community in which their identities were formed, and a need 
to experience their lives as bound up in that of their community.’[25]
Dr Mluleki Mnyaka and author Mokgethi Motlhabi together say of 
ubuntu: ‘Individuals consider themselves integral parts of the whole 
community. A person is socialised to think of himself, or herself, as 
inextricably bound to others ... Ubuntu ethics can be termed anti-
egoistic as it discourages people from seeking their own good without 
regard for, or to the detriment of, others and the community.’[26]
Dr Reuel Khoza, author of a well-regarded book on ubuntu and 
leadership, with introductions by Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, 
sums up the view this way: ‘Ubuntu is characterised by such values 
as caring, reciprocity, sharing, compassion, hospitality, cohabitation, 
cooperation and tolerance.’[27] 
Finally, renowned exponent of an ubuntu morality Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu says: ‘When we want to give high praise to someone 
we say, “Yu, u nobuntu”; “Hey, so-and-so has ubuntu.” This means they 
are generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate. They 
share what they have.’[28]
I could easily add many more citations that indicate similar ideas. 
As should be clear, none of these kinds of relationships implies, or 
otherwise requires, a genetic link between those party to them. 
Among contemporary exponents of an ubuntu ethic, it is much more 
controversial to claim that a genetic link is central to morality than it 
is to maintain that loving, friendly, communal and generally positive 
social relationships are what are to be prized. In fact, it is more 
characteristic of an ubuntu perspective to maintain that ‘it takes a 
village to raise a child’, a natural interpretation of which is that those 
without a genetic link to the young can have a vital role to play in 
their healthy upbringing.
Finally, recall that a quintessential feature of ubuntu is not a 
function of intimate, let alone biological, relationships, but is instead 
a matter of being hospitable to strangers, as Nelson Mandela[29] and 
others[26] have maintained. I have in mind the practice, widespread in 
pre-colonial Africa, of welcoming visitors to a village to the point of 
sharing one’s best food with him or her, at least for a time. Viewing 
everyone, regardless of whether or not they are related to oneself, as 
part of a human family and someone with whom to commune is also 
a core aspect of ubuntu and sub-Saharan ethics more generally.[30,31]
Severing the genetic link: Some positive 
reasons to permit it
So far I have provided objections to the major ethical arguments in 
the literature for thinking that SA’s law is just insofar as it requires an 
embryo placed in a surrogate to be genetically related to the parents 
who will care for the newborn baby. I now supplement this negative 
strategy by concluding with some brief positive considerations for 
overturning this law. Appealing to values that resonate with SA’s 
Constitution, I contend that they entail that the law is unjust.
The lack of overlapping consensus in SA society about the best 
form that the family should take provides strong reason to think 
that the government should remain neutral on the matter, letting 
residents decide for themselves. Just as it would be wrong in SA 
society for the state to intentionally promote a single religion in the 
face of religious diversity among residents, so it would be wrong 
for the state to intentionally promote a single type of family when 
there is a diversity of intelligent opinion about which sort of family is 
worthwhile. Where there is reasonable disagreement about a matter, 
as there is with respect to religion and family, respect for people’s 
judgement, privacy, autonomy and related factors normally entails 
that the state ought to let them decide for themselves, as others have 
also suggested previously, including in the context of surrogacy.[10]
One need not be a staunch Western liberal fan of autonomy to 
appreciate the force of this argument. Consider that, in terms of 
ubuntu, part of what is valuable about communal relationships is that 
people come together and stay together of their own accord and are 
not corralled into living with certain people as opposed to others. 
From that ethical standpoint, too, the state should not dictate the 
nature of the family South Africans are permitted to enjoy.
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Finally, even if there were, ex hypothesi, some substantial agreement 
among South Africans about which family is most desirable, it would 
not follow that it would necessarily be appropriate to base law on 
those views. One major ethical purpose of the SA Constitution is to 
protect those with minority viewpoints and ways of life, when these 
would not violate others’ abilities to take advantage of civil liberties, 
participation in democratic governance, socioeconomic goods and 
the like. Hence, even if a survey of South Africans indicated that a 
large majority favours a genetic link between parents and children, 
those with a different view morally should be afforded the space to 
live as they please, so long as they are not preventing others from 
choosing the kind of family they prefer or otherwise violating a right.
Conclusion
In this article I have mostly argued against a variety of ethical 
rationales for SA’s current approach to surrogacy, which requires a 
genetic link between the commissioning parents and the created 
child. These rationales have appealed to: the prospect of harm to 
the child; a slippery slope towards systematic eugenics; a principle 
of respect for human nature; and a principle of developing one’s 
humanness. In each case I argued that these considerations fail to 
provide a sound defence for the law. Furthermore, I contended that 
in the absence of a strong, or even widely held, ethical rationale for 
it, the law should be revoked out of respect for people’s privacy and 
their ability to create loving and intimate relationships.
Such a position, which would accord more liberty than a reli-
gious traditionalism, is not necessarily motivated by a radical trans-
humanism, and also need not lead to that in practice. Instead, SA’s 
Constitution and its attendant values can chart a safe course.
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